Effect of supply chain structure and power dynamics on R&D and market performances by Yoo, Seung Ho & Seo, Yong Won
Copyright © 2017 Vilnius Gediminas Technical University (VGTU) Press
Journal of Business Economics and Management
ISSN 1611-1699 / eISSN 2029-4433
2017 Volume 18(3): 487–504
doi:10.3846/16111699.2017.1326979
EFFECT OF SUPPLY CHAIN STRUCTURE AND POWER 
DYNAMICS ON R&D AND MARKET PERFORMANCES
Seung Ho YOO1, Yong Won SEO2
1SunMoon University, Asan, 336-708 Republic of Korea
2Chung-Ang University, Seoul, 156-756 Republic of Korea
E-mails: 1shy1228@sunmoon.ac.kr; 2seoyw@cau.ac.kr (corresponding author)
Received 08 November 2016; accepted 03 May 2017
Abstract. This study is the first investigating the effect of supply chain structure and play-
ers’ power dynamics on a supply chain’s R&D and market performances. We consider 
a three-stage supply chain, consisting of a R&D firm, a manufacturer, and a seller. We 
develop six supply chain models based on various structures and power dynamics, and 
reveal important implications by comparing the models. R&D performance is a function 
of supply chain structure; an integrated supply chain can expect improved performance. 
The selling price is a function of power dynamics, and is higher when R&D has bargain-
ing power. Market and profit performances are higher in an integrated, manufacturer-led 
supply chain. The manufacturer’s role must be revisited; due to its location in the middle 
of the supply chain, the manufacturer can directly control the overall chain. On the other 
hand, a R&D firm could innately be associated with marginalization issues. Therefore, it 
is important for the R&D firm to have a systematic understanding of the entire system. 
This study contributes to the literature and practice by not only bridging the gap in the 
previous studies but also offering important managerial implications.




In a contemporary business environment, many firms enjoy advantages in quality, cost, 
and/or technological expertise. They maximize return on resources by focusing on core 
competencies and strategically outsourcing non-core activities. Therefore, a common 
practice is supply chain-based business management, with functions that are decen-
tralized to specialized partners. The research and development (R&D) function is no 
exception. 
More complicated product technologies require a firm to be more reliant on its partners’ 
complementary capabilities. Controlling all required technologies is inefficient, and of-
_________
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ten virtually impossible. Therefore, the R&D function is often decentralized across 
the supply chain. R&D outsourcing and specialization is increasing, with a significant 
proven contribution to firms’ performance (Han, Bae 2014). For example, Apple Inc. 
focuses on R&D and marketing, while delegating production to key suppliers in Asian 
countries. While Samsung Electronics is responsible for both R&D and manufacturing 
functions, it often relies on its external partner’s R&D capability. It applied Qualcomm’s 
AP (application processor) technology to its Galaxy S5 smartphone, paying patent roy-
alties at 2.5–5.0% of the retail price (PhoneArena 2015). Strategic R&D specialization 
and outsourcing is not limited to the manufacturing industry. For example, Marvel 
Studios, famous for superhero movies, concentrates on developing fictional contents 
and moviemaking, while decentralizing the films’ distribution to Walt Disney Studios. 
The key role of Tencent, a Chinese IT service provider, is the distribution of a number 
of online games through its portal; however, the majority of games are developed by 
R&D partners in many countries. 
The above examples demonstrate that a supply chain’s structure varies. There is neither 
a single fixed structure nor a fixed power relationship to gain a successful R&D result 
and its distribution. Moreover, a supply chain may need to change its form to improve. 
In Samsung’s case, it recently eliminated its dependency on Qualcomm and internal-
ized the R&D of AP by adopting an in-house AP for its Galaxy S6 model (PhoneArena 
2015). Firms must constantly determine which functions to outsource and which func-
tions to focus on; it is important to understand the characteristics of possible supply 
chain structures, and also to find the best structure for superior performance. Therefore, 
this study introduces various supply chain structures, considering possible combinations 
of processes as well as power dynamics between players. It investigates the differentia-
tion of R&D and market performances through supply chain structure-related decisions. 
A three-stage supply chain is considered, comprising a specialized R&D company, a 
manufacturer, and a seller. The R&D company can be a critical supplier, a patent-hold-
ing company, or a fashion designer, whose result has a critical impact on product quality 
as well as on overall supply chain performance. For simplicity, our discussion is limited 
to cases in which either the R&D company or the manufacturer has bargaining power 
over other players (e.g., in the high-tech electronics industry). By considering possible 
combinations of processes and power dynamics, six different supply chain models, 
based on the principal-agent paradigm, are introduced. Performances are compared, 
and distinct characteristics of the six supply chain models are revealed. Specifically, 
the decisions in each model are characterized by (1) the contracts: transfer payments 
for the R&D result and item supply; (2) the R&D performance: the resulting quality 
level; (3) the selling price; (4) the market performance: demand requests; and (5) the 
profit performances of R&D, the manufacturer, the seller, and the entire supply chain. 
Despite its growing practical importance, the choice of supply chain structures and its 
effect on R&D performance has not yet been extensively studied. We contribute to this 
body of knowledge by identifying the characteristics of various supply chain structures, 
and by providing important implications.
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1. Literature review
Literature relevant to this study is: (1) strategic R&D outsourcing and specialization, 
and (2) supply chain structural design. 
A number of analytical studies have dealt with R&D performance in a decentralized sys-
tem. Many studies deal with a non-cooperative game, considering competition between 
a patent-holding R&D firm and the firms that license the patent technology (Kamien 
et al. 1992; Wang 2002; Sen 2005; Kishimoto et al. 2011; Kishimoto, Watanabe 2017). 
These studies focus on the type of license contract that can yield superior performance 
for an outside R&D firm, in most cases comparing fixed fee and per unit royalty con-
tracts. However, most R&D studies involve cost-reducing technology. Studies more 
relevant to ours, such as Stamatopoulos and Tauman (2008), Li and Wang (2010) and 
Tian (2016), address quality innovation through R&D and its effect on market perfor-
mance. They reveal that per unit royalty licensing guarantees a superior result for R&D 
firms. However, these studies are also based on a non-cooperative game, focusing on 
competition between players. They differ from this study, which focuses on a coopera-
tive game, based on the principal-agent paradigm framework in a three-stage supply 
chain in which an R&D firm, a manufacturer, and a seller collaborate. The collaboration 
that yields superior R&D, market, and profit performances, according to different supply 
chain structures and power dynamics, is revealed. 
Decentralization of certain functions inevitably results in structural supply chain chang-
es, which often accompanies double or multiple marginalization issues among players. 
It points to the phenomenon that each firm in a supply chain (e.g., a manufacturer and a 
retailer), sets its price above its marginal cost. This would happen multiple times if there 
are a number of firms at different vertical levels, subsequently leading to inefficiency 
and a loss of welfare across the entire supply chain (Spengler 1950). Two primary ap-
proaches have been used to mitigate this negative aspect of decentralization. One is 
supply chain contract design, to control and/or coordinate the decisions of overall supply 
chain players. Diverse literature addresses this issue, such as the works of Cachon and 
Lariviere (2005), Ding and Chen (2008), and Zhao et al. (2010).
A more relevant approach to this study involves directly addressing decisions regarding 
supply chain structure. Corbett and Karmarkar (2001), Carr and Karmarkar (2005) study 
optimal decisions on order quantity and price in a multi-echelon supply chain. Their 
models consider within-tier competition, but not between-tier contracts; hence, they 
do not incorporate multiple marginalization issues among players. Studies have also 
examined the structural design of a closed-loop supply chain. For example, Savaskan 
and van Wassenhove (2006) examine joint decisions on selling price, and the return 
rate of a used item. They consider various reverse channel structures for the used item 
collection by incorporating various collectors under incentive contracts. Shi and Min 
(2013) also investigate a closed-loop supply chain’s structural design problem. These 
studies primarily focus on the path difference of reverse channels involving different 
participants. In contrast, this study considers vertical integration and decentralization of 
supply chain processes, including R&D, manufacturing, and sales, as well as different 
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power dynamics among the three players, and identifies the most efficient structure. The 
work of Majumder and Srinivasan (2008) is closely related; it models a multi-tier supply 
chain network and investigates contract issues involving double marginalization. Similar 
to this study, they also investigate the effect of changes in power dynamics among play-
ers. However, they model the supply structure as given and static; we investigate various 
supply chain structure options by considering process separation and integration. The 
study of Lu et al. (2014) is similar to this one, investigating the choice of outsourcing 
or self-management as supply chain governance. It reveals that the optimal governance 
model depends on supply chain characteristics such as the costs of knowledge transfer 
and compliance. However, it differs from this work in that it does not consider differ-
ent types of power dynamics and R&D concerns, while focusing on whether or not 
to outsource a general supply chain process to a third party. In summary, while there 
have been previous studies dealing with structural supply chain design issues, one that 
directly addresses R&D decentralization and its effect on the entire supply chain – as 
in the present study – is difficult to find.
2. Basic model formulation 
This study considers consumer products, such as electronic appliances or vehicles. Con-
sumers’ buying intention is primarily affected by product quality and price. Therefore, 
consumers’ demand D is defined as follows: 
 D = α – βp + γq, (1)
where α is the demand potential, p and q are the selling price and quality of the product, 
respectively, and β and γ are the respective coefficients. 
The selling price p negatively affects D in (1) as in many previous studies, such as Raz 
and Ovchinnikov (2015), Yoo et al. (2015) and Yoo and Kim (2016). Product quality q, 
which represents R&D performance, enhances D. q is regarded as a single composite 
measure, as in Karmarkar and Pitbladdo (1997), Banker et al. (1998) and Wang and 
Shin (2015). Therefore, the value of q is regarded as a sum of measurable quality attrib-
utes, such as performance, feature, and reliability. This approach is commonly observed 
in quality management research, such as Shi et al. (2001), who define quality as the 
weighted sum of multiple attributes. 
We consider three supply chain processes: research and development (R&D), manufac-
turing, and sales, which jointly determine product quality and selling price for profit 
maximization. 
The R&D process invests in technology to enhance the quality of the product q. The 
R&D output is delivered to the manufacturing process in the form of new product 
technology, knowledge, engineering skills, and others, for which the manufacturing 
process pays the R&D process. Therefore, the profit Πr of the R&D process is defined 
as follows: 
	 Πr = Tmr – λq2,  (2)
where λq2 is the R&D expenditure to achieve the quality q. The coefficient λ represents 
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the magnitude of the cost. We define the R&D cost as increasing and convex in q, as 
in the literature related to quality investment, such as Karmarkar and Pitbladdo (1997), 
Banker et al. (1998) and Wang and Shin (2015). Tmr is the transfer payment from the 
manufacturing to the R&D process, as compensation for the transfer of R&D output. 
We will define Tmr in the next section, differentiated for the power dynamics between 
players. 
The manufacturing process utilizes the R&D output, and delivers the product to the 
sales process, which in turn determines the price of the product p and sells it to con-
sumers. Therefore, the profits of the manufacturing and sales processes Πm and Πs are 
defined, respectively, as:
	 Πm = Tsm – cD – Tmr, and  (3)
	 Πs = pD – Tsm, (4)
where c is the unit production cost. Tsm is the transfer payment from the sales process 
to the manufacturing process, incurred by the product supply. We utilize the wholesale 
price contract to describe the interaction, which is most commonly used in practice. 
Therefore, Tsm can be defined as follows, where w is the unit wholesale price:
 Tsm = wD. (5)
The supply chain models in the next section involve different combinations of processes 
and power dynamics among players, characterized by the profit functions in (2–4). 
3. Supply chain models
A three-stage supply chain is considered, comprising an R&D company (R&D, hence-
forth), a manufacturer, and a seller. The following assumption is necessary to character-
ize the power dynamics between players: 
Assumption 1. The supply chain’s focal company is either R&D or the manufacturer, 
while their bargaining power is greater than the seller’s. 
This discussion focuses on a situation in which either R&D or the manufacturer domi-
nates the seller – a dynamic that is commonly observed in the high-tech industry, where 
R&D and the manufacturer play important roles. For example, many manufacturers, 
such as GM and Toyota, lead supply chains in the automotive industry. Recently, com-
panies focusing on R&D capability – with unique expertise in technologies and relevant 
patents – have gained bargaining power over manufacturers and other supply chain 
players (e.g., Qualcomm, Inc. in the telecommunications industry). 
Assumption 2. The player with greater bargaining power acts as a Stackelberg leader, 
who, in turn, makes decisions regarding the contract terms and processes integration. 
Second, it is assumed that all players have access to the same information, as in many 
studies based on the cooperative Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg leader (i.e., either 
R&D or the manufacturer) offers contract terms using its foresight about other players’ 
actions, and determines the integration of processes. 
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Assumption 3. An existing supply chain is considered. 
We focus on comparing the performances of existing supply chains, which are not newly 
established but currently operating supply chains, where their decisions regarding sup-
ply chain structure have already been made. 
Six supply chain models with different combinations of processes and power dynamics 
are investigated, based on these assumptions: (1) Case FI: full integration (FI) of R&D 
(R), manufacturing (M), and sales (S) processes; (2) Case RM: integration of R&D 
and manufacturing processes; (3) Case MS-R: integration of manufacturing and sales 
processes, with R&D as the Stackelberg leader; (4) Case MS-M: integration of manu-
facturing and sales processes, with the manufacturer as the leader; (5) Case PD-R: pure 
decentralization (PD), with R&D as the Stackelberg leader; and (6) Case PD-M: pure 
decentralization, with the manufacturer as the leader. Figure 1 illustrates the structures 
and power dynamics of the six supply chain cases:
Fig. 1. Supply chain models (R: R&D, M: manufacturer, S: seller; solid line:  
inventory or technology flow, dotted line: contract offer)
(a) Case FI  (b) Case RM
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3.1. Case FI: full integration of R&D, manufacturing, and sales processes
Case FI deals with a fully integrated supply chain, and can be considered an ideal situ-
ation with no opportunistic behavior of players. We regard this coordinated Case FI as 
a benchmark for other cases. The player that integrates overall processes simultane-
ously plays the roles of R&D, manufacturer, and seller (RMS), and its profit ΠRMSFI 
becomes the same as the profit of the entire supply chain ΠFI, in which the superscript 
FI denotes Case FI:
	 ΠRMS
FI = ΠFI = Πr + Πm + Πs = (p – c)D – λq2, (6)
where D, Πr, Πm and Πs are in (1–4), respectively. This fully integrated situation does 
not need to consider the interaction between players. Therefore, the problem of Case 
FI can be simply defined as:
 Maximize ΠRMSFI(p, q). (7)
By partially differentiating ΠRMSFI(p, q) in (7) with respect to p and q, we obtain the 
first-order necessary conditions (FONCs), (∂ΠRMSFI/∂p) = α – 2βp + βc + γq = 0 and 
(∂ΠRMSFI/∂q) = γp – γc – 2λq = 0. Then, by simultaneously solving FONCs above, we 


















FI cq . (9)
As observed in (8) and (9), we can expect a higher optimal selling price pFI* and product 
quality qFI* when there is a larger consumer base (an increase in α); consumers are less 
sensitive to the selling price (a decrease in β); or consumers prefer a higher quality prod-
uct (an increase in γ). When quality enhancement needs more investment (an increase 
in λ), we cannot expect higher product quality. The decision structures of the optimal 
selling price and quality are also similar in other supply chain cases (see Table 1). 
To ensure pFI* > 0 and qFI* > 0 and the concavity of ΠRMSFI, the conditions below are 
necessary: 
	 α > βc, and  (10)
 4βλ – γ2 > 0.  (11)
The demand potential α must be sufficiently large in Condition (10) to ensure interior 
solutions. Condition (11) is from the second-order sufficient condition (SOSC), that is, 
|H2| = (∂2ΠRMSFI/∂p2)(∂2ΠRMSFI/∂q2) – (∂2ΠRMSFI/∂p∂q)2 = 4βλ – γ2 > 0. To ensure the 
optimal solution by guaranteeing the concavity of the profit function, there must be a 
certain balance between the positive (γ) and negative (β and λ) effects of the selling 
price and product quality on supply chain performance. Conditions (10) and (11) also 
assure the non-negativity of solutions and the concavity of profit functions in all models. 
Applying pFI* and qFI* in (1) and (4) also obtains DFI* and ΠRMSFI* (and ΠFI*). The 
solutions of all cases are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, in Section 3.6. 
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3.2. Case RM: integration of R&D and manufacturing processes
R&D or the manufacturer in Case RM integrates both R&D and manufacturing pro-
cesses, such as in the case of Sony Co. Alternatively, Case RM can also be regarded as 
a situation in which the manufacturer’s action is coordinated under R&D’s monitoring 
and control, as in the case of the close relationship between Apple Inc. and Foxconn 
Technology Group; the opposite occurs in the relationship between Toyota Motor Co. 
and Denso Co., an automotive component R&D and supplier. The player, by integrating 
two processes, plays the roles of both R&D and manufacturer (RM); while the indi-
vidual seller’s profit ΠSRM = Πs in (4), its profit ΠRMRM is as follows: 
	 ΠRM
RM = Πr + Πm = Tsm – cD – λq2 = (w – c)D – λq2,  (12)
as Tsm = wD in (5). The superscript RM denotes Case RM.
In this decentralized system, players demonstrate the same opportunistic behavior as 
in practice, maximizing their own profit. The two-stage decision structure of Case RM 
can then be defined, based on the principal-agent paradigm:
                                     Maximize  ΠRMRM (q, w);  (13)
                                     subject to   ΠSRM(p | q, w) > 0;  (14)
                                                     Maximize   ΠSRM(p | q, w).  (15)
The company conducting both R&D and manufacturing (RM) maximizes its own profit 
in (13), but needs to satisfy constraints (14) and (15). Inequality (14) represents the 
seller’s rationality. The seller participates in the contract guaranteeing the positive profit. 
Constraint (15) is the seller’s incentive compatibility constraint, in which the seller 
determines p, maximizing its own profit given the decisions of q and w. 
Through backward induction, we first obtain the response of the seller pRM, given q and 




α +β + γ
=
β
RM w qp q w .  (16)
After applying pRM to (13), and by simultaneously solving the FONCs of (13) from 



















RM cw c. (18)
The solution of Case RM is summarized in Tables 1 and 2 in Section 3.6. 
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3.3. Case MS-R: integration of manufacturing and sales  
processes with R&D as the Stackelberg leader
Case MS-R represents a supply chain in which the manufacturer directly sells the prod-
uct by integrating the sales process (e.g., the direct sales of Dell, Inc.). This can also 
be regarded as a situation in which the manufacturer coordinates the seller’s action. In 
Case MS-R, R&D has bargaining power over the manufacturer, and thus determines 
the contract term. An example is Qualcomm, Inc., which owns a number of essential 
technology patents in the telecommunications industry. The following assumption is 
added to characterize the transaction between R&D and the manufacturer:
Assumption 4. When R&D has bargaining power over the manufacturer, R&D of-
fers the technology transfer contract based on per unit royalty, while the manufacturer 
with bargaining power prefers the contract to be based on a fixed fee, independent of 
demand.
The two common payment modes for technology transfer in practice are per unit royalty 
and a fixed fee independent of the quantity produced. When patent licensing is related 
to quality innovation, Stamatopoulos and Tauman (2008), and Li and Wang (2010) have 
revealed that per unit royalty licensing is superior to fixed fee licensing from the exter-
nal R&D firm’s perspective. Thus, we suppose that R&D (that holds the power) offers a 
contract to the manufacturer based on per unit royalty in exchange for the transfer of its 
R&D results, with the expectation of continuous revenue over the product’s life cycle. 
We assume that the one-time fixed fee contract is preferred when the manufacturer has 
bargaining power over R&D, as is commonly observed in the technology acquisition of 
large manufacturing firms. Assumption 4 will be verified later, in Proposition 1.
The total transfer payment to R&D in Case MS-R is defined as follows, where r is the 
per unit royalty determined by R&D:
 TmrMS-R = rD.  (19)
The profit of the manufacturer who integrates the sales process (MS) ΠMSMS-R is defined 
as follows:
	 ΠMS
MS-R = Πm + Πs = (p – c)D – Tmr = (p – c – r)D.  (20)
R&D’s profit ΠRMS-R = Πr, as defined in (2).
Thus, the problem of Case MS-R can be defined as follows: 
                                      Maximize  ΠRMS-R(q, r);  (21)
                                      subject to   ΠMSMS-R(p | q, r) > 0;  (22)
                                                      Maximize   ΠMSMS-R(p | q, r).  (23)
Through an approach similar to Case RM, which involves a two-stage backward in-
duction and is based on differential calculus, we can obtain the optimal selling price, 
product quality, and unit royalty of Case MS-R. The optimal solution is summarized in 
Tables 1 and 2 in Section 3.6.
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3.4. Case MS-M: integration of manufacturing and sales processes with the 
manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader
Case MS-M also considers the integration of manufacturing and sales processes, as in 
Case MS-R, but the manufacturer now has the bargaining power. Therefore, the manu-
facturer outsources R&D, and offers the fixed-fee contract for R&D output transfer, as 
described in Assumption 4. The fee is proportional to the resulting product quality q, 
and is independent of demand. Therefore, the fixed fee for technology transfer from the 
manufacturer to R&D is defined in Case MS-M as:
 TmrMS-M = fq,  (24)
where f is the marginal fixed fee of the resulting quality. The manufacturer’s profit 
ΠMS
MS-M is then defined as follows, while R&D’s profit ΠRMS-R = Πr is in given in (2): 
	 ΠMS
MS-M = Πm + Πs = (p – c)D – Tmr = (p – c)D – fq.  (25)
The problem of Case MS-M can then be defined as follows: 
                                       Maximize   ΠMSMS-M(p, f );
                                       subject to   ΠRMS-R(q | p, f ) > 0;
                                                       Maximize   ΠRMS-R(q | p, f ).
The optimal solution is summarized in Tables 1 and 2 in Section 3.6. 
3.5. Case PD-R: pure decentralization with R&D as the Stackelberg leader
Case PD-R represents a supply chain in which all players maximize their own profits, 
while R&D is the focal company. All players in this purely decentralized system are 
responsible only for their basic processes, that is, ΠRPD-R = Πr in (2), ΠMPD-R = Πm in 
(3), and ΠSPD-R = Πs in (4). 
R&D in Case PD-R offers a per unit royalty contract, as in Case MS-R; thus, TmrPD-R = 
rD as in (19). Therefore, the three-stage decision structure of Case PD-R is defined as 
follows:
                Maximize  ΠRPD-R(q, r);
                subject to   ΠM(w | q, r) > 0;
                                Maximize  ΠMPD-R(w | q, r);
                                subject to  ΠSPD-R(p | q, r, w) > 0;
                                               Maximize  ΠSPD-R(p | q, r, w).
Each player’s best response is obtained by following a solution approach similar to the 
former decentralization cases, but by conducting the backward induction twice.
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3.6. Case PD-M: Pure decentralization with  
the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader
Case PD-M considers the same structure as Case PD-R, but the manufacturer has the 
bargaining power. Therefore, the manufacturer offers R&D a fixed fee contract for 
technology transfer, that is, TmrPD-M = fq as in (24), and controls the seller by offering 
a wholesale price contract. The two-stage optimization problem of Case PD-M with 
two agents, considering the dual role of the manufacturer as a control center, can be 
defined as:
                                   Maximize  ΠMPD-M(f, w)
                                   subject to   ΠRPD-M(q | f, w) > 0
                                                   Maximize  ΠRPD-M(q | f, w)
																																																			ΠS
PD-M(p | f, w) > 0
                                                   MaximizeΠSPD-M(p | f, w).
The solutions of all models are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1. Solution summary: variables
Case
Contract Decision Consumer response
r* or f * w* p* q* D*
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4. Comparison of supply chain structures
This section reveals the unique characteristics of the supply chain models. First, As-
sumption 4 regarding the payment mode selection for technology transfer is verified. 
Proposition 1. If the fixed fee contract is adopted in Cases MS-R and PD-R, this does 
not guarantee the concavity of ΠR, while the per unit royalty contract also does not 
guarantee the concavity of ΠM in Cases MS-M and PD-M.
Proof of Proposition 1. In Cases MS-R, the Hessian determinants of ΠR are |H1| = 
(∂2ΠR/∂q2) = –2λ < 0 and |H2| = (∂2ΠR/∂q2)(∂2ΠR/∂f2) – (∂2ΠR/∂q∂f)2 = –1 < 0, if we 
apply Tmr = fq in (24). They do not satisfy the negative-definite property of the second-
order sufficient condition, and hence profit maximization is not guaranteed. This is 
similar to Case PD-R, which also shows |H1| < 0 and |H2| < 0 if we apply Tmr = fq. In 
Cases MS-M and PD-M, the concavity of ΠM is also not guaranteed if we apply Tmr = 
rD. Therefore, Proposition 1 holds. 
When R&D has power over the manufacturer, it can maximize its own profit by offering 
a per unit royalty contract, which cannot be done with a fixed fee contract. This explains 
why the per unit royalty scheme is a common licensing contract of patent technology 
in practice, when a patent-holding company such as Qualcomm has stronger bargaining 
power. Offering a per unit royalty contract to external R&D is not a reasonable choice 
for the manufacturer, while a fixed fee contract guarantees the manufacturer’s profit 
maximization. As we can observe in practice, manufacturing companies with power, 
such as Samsung Electronics, are not willing to pay per unit royalty for the lifecycle of 
a product to an R&D firm. Instead, they prefer to acquire the technology at a one-time 
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fixed payment, or sometimes even try to merge with a firm owning the patent technol-
ogy, such as Harman International Industries with audio technology. Next, we character-
ize the interaction among players in the supply chain models. 
Proposition 2. The following properties are obtained by investigating the transfer pay-
ments:
(1) r MS-R* > r PD-R* and f MS-M* > fPD-M*, and
                             (2) w PD-R* > w RM* > w PD-M*. 
Proof of Propositions 2–4. The results of Propositions 2–4 are obtained by direct com-
parison of the optimal solutions summarized in Tables 1 and 2. For example, rMS-R* – 
rPD-R* = 4γ2λ(α – βc)/[(8βλ – γ2)(16βλ – γ2)], and it yields rMS-R* > rPD-R*, based on 
α > βc in Condition (10) and 4βλ – γ2 > 0 in Condition (11). This establishes the result 
of Proposition 2(1). Following similar approaches by direct comparison, we obtain the 
results of Propositions 2–4.
The transfer payment for the R&D result from the manufacturer to R&D is always 
greater in the integrated supply chain structure (Case MS-R or MS-M) than in the de-
centralized system (Case PD-R or PD-M), as noted in Proposition 2(1). This relationship 
holds, regardless of a payment type of royalty per unit sold (Cases MS-R and PD-R) 
or fixed fee (Cases MS-M and PD-M). This implies that manufacturing firms like Tesla 
can take advantage of a better understanding of the consumer market; it can integrate 
sales and service to target a premium market with a higher quality product through bet-
ter facilitation of investment in quality by an outside R&D firm such as Panasonic with 
battery technologies. The wholesale price w is also determined differently, depending 
not only on the supply chain structure, but also on the power dynamics between play-
ers, as in Proposition 2(2). w is determined as the largest in Case PD-R, while it is the 
smallest in Case PD-M. The highest w in the R&D-led decentralized system (Case PD-
R) is due to the three-stage decision structure and innate triple marginalization issues, as 
observed in the problem structure in Section 3.5. On the other hand, the lowest w in the 
manufacturer-led decentralized system (Case PD-M) is because the manufacturer can 
mitigate marginalization issues by centralized control, directly controlling opportunistic 
behaviors of both R&D and the seller, as seen in Section 3.6. 
These different interactions between players then induce different R&D performance 
and selling price decisions.
Proposition 3. The following properties are obtained by comparing product quality 
and selling prices:
(1) qFI* > qRM* = qMS-R* = qMS-M* > qPD-R* = qPD-M*, and
                    (2) pPD-R* > pRM* = pMS-R* > pPD-M* > pFI* > pMS-M*. 
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the results of Proposition 3. In Proposition 3(1) and as 
shown in Figure 2, product quality q, representing R&D performance, is a function of 
the supply chain structure. The resulting q is clearly differentiated by the level of pro-
cess integration. Specifically, the highest value of q is expected in the fully coordinated 
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system (Case FI), while the purely decentralized supply chain always yields the lowest 
value of q (Cases PD-R and PD-M). This illustrates that the level of process integration 
is a critically affects product quality. If a company prioritizes the premium market by 
targeting a consumer segment that prefers a high-quality product, it is advantageous to 
maintain an integrated system that closely coordinates overall supply chain processes 
and decisions, not only in R&D and manufacturing, but also in sales. Tesla announced 
in 2014 that it decided to internalize the R&D and production of battery cells – of 
which many parts were formerly outsourced to Panasonic – by building its Gigafactory 
in Nevada, U.S. in cooperation with Panasonic. It aims to produce electric vehicles in 
sufficient numbers, and to accelerate the R&D of high-quality batteries and innovative 
manufacturing through this cooperation. On the other hand, it is also interesting to ob-
serve that the results are completely independent of the supply chain’s power dynamics. 
Note that R&D’s bargaining power does not affect R&D performance, that is, qMS-R* = 
qMS-M*, and qPD-R* = qPD-M*.
Further, note that the selling price p in Proposition 3(2) and Figure 2 is a function of 
the supply chain’s power dynamics. p is higher when R&D controls the supply chain 
(Cases MS-R and PD-R), which is also noted in the solid-line area of Figure 2. This is 
due to multiple marginalization issues in the R&D-led supply chain system, as explained 
in Proposition 2(2). However, p can decrease if the manufacturer has the bargaining 
power (Cases MS-M and PD-M), as noted in the dotted-line area of Figure 2. This is 
because the manufacturer is located in the middle of the supply chain between R&D 
and the seller, and can directly control the overall supply chain’s actions, as displayed 
in Figures 1 (d) and (f). Additionally, the level of coordination does not coincide with a 
lower selling price; we observe that the fully coordinated system without marginaliza-
tion issues can yield a higher selling price than in the decentralized case, that is, pFI* > 
pMS-M*. This results from the higher product quality in Case FI. However, higher quality 
does not always translate into a higher selling price.
Fig. 2. Comparison of result of product quality and selling price in Proposition 3  
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Overall, supply chain structure and power dynamics determine a product’s quality and 
selling price. Each supply chain model’s unique decision structure differently influences 
market and profit performance. 
Proposition 4. The following properties are found by comparing demand requests and 
the supply chain’s overall profits:
(1) DFI* > DMS-M* > DRM* = DMS-R* > DPD-M* > DPD-R*, and
                  (2) ΠFI* > ΠMS-M* > ΠRM* = ΠMS-R* > ΠPD-M* > ΠPD-R*. 
Proposition 4 indicates that the market and profit performances are functions of both the 
supply chain structure and power dynamics, while a comparison of results of the two 
performance measures appear identical. Specifically, the supply chain structure or the 
level of process integration is the main determinant of performance, that is, both market 
and profit performances of a fully integrated system {Case FI} > partially integrated 
systems {MS-M, RM, MS-R} > a purely decentralized system {PD-M, PD-R}. The 
power dynamics again differentiate the performances, while the manufacturer-led sys-
tem yields a superior result to the R&D-led system, that is, the performances of MS-M 
> MS-R = RM, while PD-M > PD-R. This is due to the ability of the manufacturer – 
located in the middle of a supply chain – to mitigate inefficiency problems resulting 
from marginalization issues through centralized control.
R&D is located at the upstream end of the supply chain, making it difficult to similarly 
play the role of a control center, as noted in the decision structure in Section 3.5. There-
fore, the multiple marginalization problems of an R&D-led system can make the overall 
system inefficient. These would worsen, as the structure of a supply chain is more com-
plicated in practice. Therefore, in practice, it is critical for the specialized R&D firm to 
systematically understand the supply chain’s overall processes and interactions to find 
a way to control other players’ actions. Focusing on marketing as well as R&D – two 
core processes at the supply chain’s downstream and upstream ends – can be one solu-
tion. This will help firms to effectively understand and control the entire supply chain, 
as in the cases of Apple, Inc. and Nike, Inc.
It is also worth observing that Cases RM and MS-R perform equally in terms of quality, 
price, demand, and supply chain profit, in spite of their different value chain structures. 
This indicates that R&D can choose the supply chain structure while maintaining the 
same performance. 
Conclusions
In recent business environments, a common practice is supply chain-based business 
management, where functions decentralized to specialized partners. The R&D function 
is no exception as increasing complexity of technologies require a firm to be more de-
pendent upon its partners’ complementary technological capabilities. When a firm forms 
a supply chain with its partners, it becomes of great importance in business practices to 
understand the effect of supply chain structure and players’ power dynamics on a supply 
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chain’s R&D and market performances. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the 
first to investigate these issues. Thus, this study contributes to the literature by bridging 
the gap between practice and academia, while providing valuable practical insights to 
the firms forming supply chains.
In this study, R&D performance is investigated in a multi-tier supply chain context, 
consisting of a specialized R&D firm, a manufacturer, and a seller. Six different types 
of supply chain models, differing in process integration and power dynamics, are intro-
duced. Then, the comparison of their R&D, market, and profit performance provides not 
only important implications for R&D practice but also practical guidelines for practicing 
managers in a decentralized supply chain system. These can be summarized as follows.
First, a different payment mode for technology transfer must be selected, relative to the 
power dynamics in a supply chain. When R&D has bargaining power, it can maximize 
its own profit by a per unit royalty contract, while the fixed fee contract guarantees the 
manufacturer’s profit maximization. Second, interactions among players are affected 
by both supply chain structure and power dynamics. The transfer payment for R&D 
output is greater in the integrated than in the decentralized structure. The wholesale 
price is higher when R&D has bargaining power, due to innate multiple marginalization 
issues. Third, product quality, or R&D performance is a function of the supply chain 
structure, higher in more integrated supply chains. Therefore, it is very important to 
design the structure of a supply chain based on the careful consideration of the market 
we target. A company targeting a premium market segment must closely coordinate 
overall supply chain decisions in an integrated system to yield a high-quality product. 
Further, note that power dynamics do not affect R&D performance. Fourth, the selling 
price is a function of power dynamics in a supply chain. The R&D-led supply chain 
yields a higher selling price, owing to marginalization issues; this can decrease if the 
manufacturer has the bargaining power, due to its centralized control over the supply 
chain. Fifth, the supply chain structure is the main determinant of market and profit 
performances, thereafter power dynamics differentiate the performances once again. 
The integrated, manufacturer-led system guarantees superior market and profit perfor-
mance. The manufacturer’s role must be revisited; it can mitigate marginalization issues 
by directly coordinating or controlling the overall supply chain’s actions, based on its 
location between R&D and the seller. Sixth, it is important for the R&D firm to resolve 
multiple marginalization issues by systematically understanding the entire system. One 
solution would involve commanding both R&D and marketing, two core processes at 
the upstream and downstream ends. 
While this study has important implications for research and practice, its limiting as-
sumptions need to be relaxed in a future study. First, we have assumed that either R&D 
or the manufacturer has the bargaining power in the supply chain. However, many 
supply chains are led by the seller, who is better positioned to understand consumer 
behavior. Therefore, it will be interesting to compare the seller-led model. Second, only 
the wholesale price contract was considered for the product supply. However, there are 
various types of contracts, which will differently affect overall performance. Third, we 
have not considered two possible supply chain cases from our study, involving the in-
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tegration of R&D and sales processes with either R&D or the manufacturer as a leader. 
Its inclusion may require us to additionally consider the production performance, such 
as the conformance of quality to design specification, while the present study focuses 
on the R&D and market performances. A study that investigates these two cases, based 
on the present study’s results, will enhance the implications for supply chain practice, 
and for effectively understanding supply chains such as Apple and Li & Fung. Fourth, 
we have adopted a quadratic function form for R&D investment, which is very common 
in many previous studies of quality management. However, if a further study adopts a 
general convex function or other types of function forms, it would provide more gener-
alized implications for supply chain practice. Incorporating the above issues in a future 
study will allow the development of practical implications that better correspond to the 
current supply chain environment.
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